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The pervasiveness of online trolling has been attributed 
to the effect of online toxic disinhibition, suggesting that 
perpetrators behave in less socially desirable ways 
online than they do offline. It is possible that this 
disinhibition effect allows for everyone to start on a 
level playing field online, regardless of race, gender, or 
nationality, but it is likewise possible that the 
disinhibition effect is context-dependent and sensitive to 
socio-cultural variations. We aim to explore if toxic 
online disinhibition effects depend on national culture 
and gender by examining the extent of trolling towards 
tweets by Americans and Indians, from both genders. 
Content analysis of 3,000 Twitter posts reveals that 
significantly more trolling comments were posted on 
tweets by Americans than by Indians, and on tweets by 
women than men. We conclude that the online 
disinhibition effect may exacerbate, replicate, or 
mediate existing socio-cultural differences, but it does 
not eliminate them. 
1. Introduction  
With fewer global barriers to access and use of social 
media platforms, trolling is now everywhere. More than 
500 million tweets are posted daily, spreading 
misinformation, disinformation and trolling, leading 
Twitter to announce new ways to combat the latter [1]. 
These trolling behaviors, like other less socially 
desirable activities, are largely enabled by the toxic 
online disinhibition effect [2]. Online, people feel less 
visible, more anonymous, and much of their interactions 
with others are asynchronous, as a result their sense of 
power dynamics is distorted, and they are more likely to 
disassociate themselves from their online actions once 
they are offline. This leads to an increase in online 
behaviors that are not regulated in the same way as real 
life; then, more trolling, harassment and abuse are 
noticeable on online platforms. As trolling behaviors 
spread widely, research follows with significant efforts 
to detect trolling, identify trolls’ motivations, behaviors, 
and tactics, to understand the impact of trolling on 
individuals and communities, and unpack perceptions of 
and reactions to trolling [e.g., 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. What 
becomes clear is that online trolling is multidimensional 
and context-dependent, thus varying from one setting to 
another [8]. Whereas less socially desirable behaviors 
more prominently surface online, it is possible that 
trolling may exacerbate, replicate, or mediate existing 
socio-cultural differences. It is also possible that certain 
attributes of trolling targets play a role in trolling as 
well: “harassment on the basis of race and gender is 
indicative of trolling” [7, p. 1]; yet, research mostly 
focuses on online perpetrators. Early research on the 
impact of trolling targets on the extent and type of 
trolling, reveals that not only the gender of the 
perpetrator, but also the gender of target plays a role in 
online trolling [e.g., 9, 10] . Individuals from different 
genders troll differently [e.g., 11], and women have 
been the target of more online trolling than men [9].  
Other attributes of trolling targets and perpetrators 
may have an impact on the extent and type of trolling as 
well. For example, it is possible that trolling targets in 
different countries will have different experiences. The 
theory of cultural relativity suggests that different 
cultures have their own standards of acceptable 
behaviors [10]. Online disinhibition is partially enabled 
by reduced status, power, and authority, compared to 
face-to-face [2], and since status and power distance 
vary between countries [12], national culture of trolling 
targets cannot be ignored. Power differences online may 
be as prominent or even more noticeable than they are 
offline, and trolling targets in high power distance 
cultures (India, for example) may have different trolling 
experiences than those in low power distance cultures 
(USA, for example). However, while power dynamics 





may shift online [2], power differences may become 
unnoticeable and as such, regardless of demographics 
[10] powerless or powerful trolling targets may be 
treated equally bad. It is also possible that those in 
position of political power will be the target of more 
trolling online than those who are less powerful. 
Nonetheless, there is little research on the extent to 
which targets’ national culture have on their trolling 
experience. Our study is informed by and aims to 
contribute to Suler’s (2004) disinhibition effect theory, 
by addressing the following research question: Does 
trolling vary based on target’s national culture (country 
of residency)? We report significant differences in the 
scope and type of trolling between Twitter users in the 
USA and India. We provide socio-cultural explanations 
to these differences and suggest future research 
directions. Our study makes a significant contribution to 
the theory of online disinhibition, with empirical 
evidence, showing that national culture plays a role in 
trolling; this means that the online toxic disinhibition 
effect does not simply equalize the playing field for all 
users online, but that instead it is sensitive to cultural 
variations. We conclude arguing that the online toxic 
disinhibition is context dependent and varies from one 
setting to another.       
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1 The Disinhibition Effect 
People behave differently online than they do 
offline; they say and do things that are less socially 
acceptable and desirable. Some simply loosen up and 
more openly reveal themselves to others, while those 
who feel less restrained act in hurtful ways, harming 
individuals and groups. This phenomenon has been 
termed the online disinhibition effect, and it has two 
opposing manifestations. The first, benign disinhibition, 
describes the act of revealing more emotions and 
kindness; and the second, toxic disinhibition, describes 
the act of using rude language, or revealing hate, anger, 
and strong criticism of others. Online trolling is enabled 
by the toxic online disinhibition effect. Prior research 
focused attention on the causes for toxic online 
disinhibition more than benign disinhibition [13]. 
Suler (2004) suggests that the disinhibition effect is 
caused by six factors: 1) dissociative anonymity: when 
people can hide their online identity and behave in less 
socially desired ways, even disassociating their online 
selves from their real offline selves; 2) invisibility: 
people don’t see or hear each other on online textual 
platforms; the invisibility gives way to a comfort which 
enables them to do things they otherwise would not; 3) 
asynchronicity: when people don’t have to worry about 
others’ immediate reactions to their behaviors and 
words on asynchronous platforms, disinhibition is 
increased; 4) solipsistic introjection: as the boundaries 
of self and others are blurred in the absent of face-to-
face cues, a person assigns a voice and face to the words 
of their online companion, shaped by the person’s 
expectation in addition to their companion’s words; 5) 
dissociative imagination: the combination of the above 
factors result in the belief that when people turn off the 
computer, their actions and imagined companion are 
simply left behind and have nothing to do with their 
offline reality; and 6) minimization of authority: when 
online, offline cues of authority (dress, body language) 
disappear; the elimination of elevated positions results 
in the unanimous feeling of possessing an equal voice. 
Thus, “[e]veryone—regardless of status, wealth, race, or 
gender—starts off on a level playing field.” [2, p. 324].  
We aim to gain a nuanced understanding of this 
sixth factor in Suler’s framework and its manifestation 
in online trolling on Twitter, because power dynamic 
still play an important role in online trolling. For 
example, celebrities have more power and influence 
than others in society and online equalizations bring 
celebrities closer to everyone, becoming then more 
accessible to all online users.  
At the same time, rolls, can troll all online users equally; 
instead, they can choose who to troll, based on factors 
like their target’s gender, race, or nationality. When 
trolling women more, trolls reinforce existing power 
imbalance also online. Furthermore, cultural differences 
in power dynamics that exist offline within a culture, 
may impact trolling online, impacting the online toxic 
disinhibition effect as well. We focus on the sixth factor 
in Suler’s framework to see if the level playing field 
online is indeed equal or if existing offline differences 
(e.g., power imbalance) still matter when it comes to the 
online toxic disinhibition effect, and the extent of 
trolling different target groups are susceptible to 
receive. There is still a need to understand the impact of 
national culture on online disinhibition and the 
variations of the effect between countries. It is possible 
that cultural norms, which regulate behaviors offline, 
may impact toxic online disinhibition effect as well.   
2.2 Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions framework [12] has 
been treated as a paradigm in cross cultural studies. 
While this framework has received a lot of criticism, it 
is perhaps the most widely used framework in cross-
cultural research. It includes six cultural values: power 
distance, individualism-collectivism, masculinity-
femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long term-short term 
orientation, and indulgence-restraint [12]. 
Power distance is defined as "the extent to which 
the less powerful members of organizations and 
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institutions (like the family) accept and expect that 
power is distributed unequally" [12, p. 80]. 
Individualism refers to a society in which “ties between 
individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after 
himself or herself…[while] Collectivism… pertains to 
societies in which people…are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in groups” [p. 114]. Masculinity relates to 
societies in which social “gender roles are clearly 
distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, 
tough…whereas women are supposed to be modest, 
tender, and concerned with quality of life” [p. 170]; 
“femininity pertains to societies in which social gender 
roles overlap [p. 171]. Uncertainty avoidance is defined 
as “the extent to which the members of a culture feel 
threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations” [p. 
229]. Long term orientation refers to societies that are 
“oriented towards future reward… perseverance, and 
thrift, [while] short term orientation… [refers to 
societies that are] oriented towards past and 
present…respect of tradition, preservation of “face,” 
and fulfilling social obligations” [pp. 284-285]. 
Indulgence stands for a society that “allows relatively 
free gratification of basic and natural human drives 
related to enjoying life and having fun…[whereas] 
restraint societies…[believe] that such gratification 
needs to be curbed and regulated by strict social norms” 
[p. 333].  
In our study we focus on two countries, the USA 
and India, representing high and low power distance 
ranks; we have used country of residency of the target 
account holders. Table 1 provides the scores and ranks 
for the USA and India, from hofstede-insights.com, on 
each of these six cultural dimensions, as well as the 
range of scores and the number of countries ranked on 
each dimension. 
 








Power distance  77 40 11-104 
Masculinity  56 62 5-110 
Long term 51 26 0-100  
Individualism 48 91 6-91 
Uncertainty 
avoidance 
40 46 8-112 
Indulgence 26 68 0-100 
 
3. Relevant Work  
Just a few years ago, more than 340 million Twitter 
users post over 500 million tweets every single day, and 
now only about 199 million active users tweet daily; 
while one of five American adults is an active Twitter 
user, most of Twitter’s users (262 million) are not 
American [14]. But with this social media surge also 
comes a steady growth of abuse, misinformation, 
trolling and harassment [15, 16]. There are many users 
who “exploit the platform to promote a hostile 
environment and spread false information and 
propaganda,” even as most users post content related to 
their “innocuous feelings, opinions, ideas, and 
information” [16, p. 152]. The online disinhibition 
effect, along with other sociotechnical affordances, 
enables these anti-social behaviors on social media 
platforms. Yet, Twitter is perhaps more susceptible to 
public debate and trolling due to its enabling 
architecture: users are granted the ability to write short 
tweets along with the creative use of memes [17]. They 
can also be more “linguistically and argumentatively 
simple” due to character restrictions, more “impulsive” 
because of the convenience of posting on the go with a 
device like a mobile phone, and more “uncivil due to 
informality and depersonalized interactions” [18, p. 60]. 
With Twitter’s anonymity and reach, harassment and 
hate speech have become part of a “landscape that is 
abstract and beyond the realms of traditional law 
enforcement” [19, p. 83]. As such, Twitter is one of the 
main hubs of social media trolling; what leads to more 
trolling on the platform is the fact that many public 
figures and politicians are regular users of Twitter.  
Because political trolling is widespread on the 
platform, recent scholarly attention was given to the 
automatic identification of online trolling on  
Twitter through linguistic analysis of trolling datasets 
[e.g., 5, 20, 21, 22, 23]. Efforts to identify trolling on 
Twitter are important, as these trolls negatively affect 
the political process, cause distrust in the political 
systems, and increase political polarization and conflict 
[24]. Most of these efforts aim to identify troll accounts 
by Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA), which 
attempted to interfere with the 2016 U.S. election; the 
IRA utilized fake accounts on Twitter, known as 
“Russian trolls,” that aimed at spreading misinformation 
and politically biased information. The “Kremlin trolls” 
simply aim to undermine American political 
institutions, spread discord within American society, 
and undermine the United States’ global influence [25]. 
Scholars [23] focused on anti-democratic discourse and 
investigated the linguistic profile of Twitter trolls and 
found that trolls tend to write shorter posts and used a 
smaller number of lexical types and tokens. Others [22] 
developed machine learning models that predict 
whether a Twitter account is a Russian troll, using both 
behavioral and linguistic features. They found that 
Russian troll accounts on Twitter were not merely bots, 
but instead managed their online identities in various 
complex ways. Another study [20] examined how trolls 
attempted to manipulate public opinion; they identified 
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theoretically grounded linguistic markers of deception 
and showed that deceptive language cues can help 
identify trolls accurately. While these studies are 
important, they largely focused on the trolls and 
disregard attributes of trolling targets. 
Political trolling is spreading also around the globe 
as politicians use social media platforms more often to 
promote their political agendas [e.g., 17, 26, 27, 28, 29]; 
yet little is known about the variations of trolling across 
countries [30]. According to Evolvi [31], 31% of tweets 
referred to political leaders like Donald Trump, Sadiq 
Khan, Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Angela 
Merkel, indicating that “tweets discuss politics 
globally,” alluding to both left- and right-wing politics 
[17, p. 7]. The “trolls’ political performance is a global 
phenomenon” [17, p. 4097], and many instances of 
state-sponsored trolling within and across countries are 
driven by political agendas [e.g., 32]. There are growing 
trends of political trolling in Turkey, Russia, India, UK, 
and the USA [17]. Satirical political trolling manifested 
cultural differences and was more prevalent in countries 
with low power distance than high power distance 
scores [30].  
It is possible that tweets from certain countries may 
attract different amounts of trolling. Using Hofstede’s 
power distance dimensions [12], we examine whether 
trolling towards tweets by individuals from high power 
distance (India) and low power distance (USA) 
countries differ. Because India is ranked much higher 
than the USA on the power distance index (Table 1), we 
expect more trolling to happen towards American 
Twitter users than Indian Twitter users, and propose to 
test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Tweets by Americans will be the targets of more 
trolling than tweets by Indians. 
 
This might be exacerbated by other attributes of 
trolling targets, specifically by gender. According to 
research done on online trolling of UK Members of 
Parliament, female politicians were subject to more 
racial and sexual abuse—along with misogynistic 
comments—than men, who were attacked based on their 
professional duties [15]. In the same study, males 
reported concern on their professional damage whereas 
females expressed concern about personal safety; 
however, females faced more emotional and 
psychological stress, in addition to overall damage to 
their reputation. In another study, tweets by female 
politicians were the target of more trolling than tweets 
by male politicians [9]. In a study of sex differences in 
anti-social behaviors, men reported more antisocial 
motives for using Facebook than did women, while 
women reported stronger prosocial motives for using 
Facebook [33]. Based on another analysis of Twitter 
trolls targeting three female journalists in India, Regu 
[34, p. 437] concluded that “social media platforms 
constitute convenient havens of harassment against 
assertive women.” Ortiz [7, p. 6] claimed that “trolling 
is a mechanism through which White men, especially 
politically conservative men, collectively target others 
with their rage, disgust, and discontent”; while this 
claim might be too extreme, trolls are motivated at times 
to troll because of their target’s gender. Trolling has 
been widely associated with males as trolls, and females 
as the target of trolling [e.g., 9, 34, 10], and cyber-
harassment typically targets females more frequently 
than males [11]. Scholars [11, p. 141] call for research 
that looks at the intersection of gender with “other 
aspects of an individual’s identity in their experiences 
of and vulnerabilities to cyberviolence,” including 
trolling, and thus we propose to test the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: Tweets by female Americans will be the targets of 
more trolling than tweets by others.    
 
Using Twitter data, we test for the impact of the 
target’s national culture (country of residency: 
USA/India) and gender (female/male), as well as the 
impact of the intersection of the two on the scope of 
trolling.  
4. Method 
We collected data from Twitter on February 9-23, 
2020, using ExportComments.com, and utilizing a 
Twitter account that we created for this purpose. We 
collected 200 tweets from eight Twitter accounts of 
celebrities from two countries (Table 2) (most recent 25 
tweets per account) and all their respective comments. 
To reduce confounding variables effect, these eight 
celebrities had either similar stature, social media 
presence, or popularity in the respective countries. 
Then, we randomly sampled 15 comments per tweet, 
which resulted in 375 comments per account and a total 
of 3,000 comments in our sample. Our sample included 
an equal number of comments per account, and an equal 
number of comments by country of residency and by 
gender. 
 
Table 2. Gender and country of residence per 
account 
Account Holder Country of 
Residence 
Gender 
Abhishek Bachchan  India Male 
Alexandria Ocasio-
Cortez (AOC)  
USA Female 
Anushka Sharma  India Female 
Donald Trump USA Male 
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Kevin Spacey USA Male 
Lindsay Lohan USA Female 
Mamata Banerjee India Female 
Narendra Modi India Male 
 
We uploaded the comments into NVivo12, a 
software for qualitative data analysis, to facilitate 
content analysis. Then we developed a codebook with 
eight trolling tactics through an iterative process of 
coding and discussion among the authors, and tested it 
on a sample of our data (Table 3). We then coded the 
data at the individual post level; each of the 3,000 posts 
was coded with all the relevant codes. Inter-coder 
reliability was 85% simple agreement.  
5. Findings 
Table 3. Trolling tactics and their frequencies 











































































346 95 251 
Total   1,711 466 1245 
 
We found that some trolling behaviors were more 
common than others, with derailment, provocation, 
pseudo-sincere, personal attacks, and insulting as the 
most frequent trolling techniques (Table 3). Trolling 
frequencies varied by country of residence. We found 
more trolling comments in the USA than in India, and 
more trolling of females’ tweets than of males’ (Table 
4). We tested for differences across target groups using 
cross-tabulation statistics and found that these 
differences were statistically significant (Table 5), 
meaning that both country of residency and gender of 
trolling targets has an impact on the extent of trolling 
targets receive; the combination of the two (gender by 
country of residency) further exacerbate this impact. 
Thus, we found support for both of our hypotheses 
(Table 6). 
 
Table 4. Frequency of trolling by country of 
residence and gender 
Demographics Female Male Total 
India 211 255 466 
USA 699 546 1,245 
Total 910 801 1,711 
 
Table 5. Results of statistical tests of 
differences across categories 
Demographics χ2 
Gender 16.161*** 
Country of residence 825.454*** 
Gender by country  16.078*** 










Table 6. Results of hypotheses testing 
Hypothesis Results 
H1: Tweets by Americans will be the 
targets of more trolling than tweets by 
Indians. 
Supported 
H2: Tweets by female Americans will 
be the targets of more trolling than 




Our study makes two major contributions that will 
be the focus of our discussion. First, our findings show 
that not all trolling targets are created equal. Trolling 
targets experience different levels and types of trolling, 
depending on the country they live in and on their 
gender. Second, cultural diversity plays a role in toxic 
online disinhibition. In contradiction to Suler’s (2004) 
suggestions that users, regardless of status, wealth, 
gender, and race are positioned online equally. Our 
study suggests that these differences are not eliminated 
online. We argue that the online disinhibition effect is 
sensitive to target attributes.  
First, our study expands prior research that suggests 
that the extent and nature of trolling is context 
dependent and varies between countries; we 
demonstrate that tweets by American celebrities are 
subject to more trolling than tweets by Indian 
celebrities. The variations might be due to socio-cultural 
differences, as there are significant differences between 
the two nations’ cultural values [12, 35]. The USA is a 
society with low power distance “which might provide 
a better environment for trolling” [30, p. 10] than India. 
In fact, the two countries are ranked differently on all of 
Hofstede’s dimensions (Table 1), most notably when it 
comes to power distance, individualism, and 
indulgence; cultural norms in the USA may be more 
accepting of trolling and toxic disinhibition.  
It is possible that the differences in trolling targets 
from the two countries are due to the fact that India is a 
more authoritarian state, where trolling may occur less 
due to the perceived lack of online anonymity, that 
results in higher probability of censorship or self-
censorship and in fear of consequences in real-life [30]. 
The lack of perceived anonymity in India, which is 
detrimental to online disinhibition [2], limits the extent 
of trolling in that country.  
Moreover, censorship may be higher in India than 
in the USA, despite the fact that the value of free speech 
is part of both nations’ constitutions. In the USA, the 
First Amendment ensures the freedom of speech for all 
citizens of America and restricts any prohibition of the 
same. In India, Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian 
Constitution also grants freedom of speech and 
expression to all its citizens. While both constitutions 
allude to the importance of free speech, it has been 
practiced differently in the two countries, perhaps due 
to differences between their cultures. The USA is a 
universalistic culture and India is a particularistic 
culture [35]. In universalistic cultures, rules are more 
important than relationships, and thus the public adhere 
to the rules, while in particularistic cultures, 
relationships and other situational factors are more 
important than rules, which thus serve only as a 
recommendation, a point of departure [35]. Because 
India is a particularistic culture [36], Indians may 
perceive Article 19(1)(a) of their constitution only as a 
recommendation and not a promotion of free speech. As 
a result, trolling is less common in India than in the 
USA.  
Still, it is possible that the magnitude of trolling in 
the two countries differ simply because of differences in 
social media use and internet availability among the 
masses. Even though India accounts for more internet 
users and social media users than the USA, the USA 
accounted for almost 4.5 times more Twitter users than 
India in 2020. Future research could examine trolling 
variations between countries with similar social media 
use patterns, but different cultures, in order to test if and 
to what extent cultural factors play a role in explaining 
trolling variations.  
Second, our study provides a nuanced 
understanding of the disinhibition effect, showing that 
national culture matters; online disinhibition may 
exacerbate, replicate, or mediate existing socio-cultural 
biases, but it does not eliminate them. Cultural norms 
regulate behaviors online and offline, and the online 
disinhibition effect does not eliminate them. As power 
dynamics shift online [2], trolling behaviors are not 
equally distributed across targets demographics but 
differ between genders and across cultures, despite 
minimization of authority and power dynamics online. 
Sociocultural biases persist online and the disinhibition 
effect may only intensify their manifestation, at least in 
terms of gender and country of residency. Indeed, the 
online disinhibition effect does not eliminate existing 
socio-cultural biases and service discrimination persists 
online [37]. While service discrimination may not be 
intentional, trolling is. 
Online disinhibition is partially enabled by reduced 
status, power, and authority online, but power distance 
varies between countries [12], and national cultural 
norms seem to play a dominant role in trolling, 
exacerbating other socio-cultural variations and 
impacting trolling. As a result, the online disinhibition 
effect may not be as prominent in some cultures as in 
others, as cultures have their own standards for 
acceptable and deviant behaviors [10]. Future research 
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may examine the more nuanced cultural disparities in 
the effect of online disinhibition.  
In our study, targets’ genders were not hidden from 
Twitter users, and while disinhibition may cause 
perpetrators to behave badly towards all users regardless 
of their gender, we found that trolls target females more 
often. Suler and Phillips [10, p. 275] claim that there are 
more male perpetrators online than female, and that 
“online males…have a more difficult time 
restraining…their Eros-ridden nature...lacking in the 
compassion…that is needed to realize how other users 
are…real people. Maybe there simply are more male 
users…resulting in a "boys club" atmosphere that 
encourages…the harassment of women.” While this last 
argument is in line with our findings (more trolling 
towards females than males), it is in sharp contrast to 
Suler’s (2004) argument that everyone, regardless of 
gender, for example, starts off equally online. Clearly, 
when studies show that female targets are trolled more 
frequently than males, it is impossible to make the case 
that females and males are treated equally online, at 
least when it comes to trolling on Twitter. Future 
research may examine whether targets’ genders matter 
across platforms. Perhaps there will be less of a disparity 
between trolled genders on platforms where the majority 
of users are women. Thus, we conclude that 
sociocultural factors, such as the demographics of 
trolling targets, are impactful online, suggesting a 
nuanced disinhibition effect. Future research may 
examine if socio-cultural differences online exacerbate, 
replicate, or mediate existing socio-cultural biases. 
7. Limitations 
One of the limitations of the study is that our sample 
of accounts may allow for intervening variables to 
mitigate our findings. For example, it is possible that in 
addition to the targets’ demographics, targets’ 
personality and political views may play a role in the 
extent and type of trolling their tweets receive. Another 
limitation is that we chose only two countries to 
examine the impact of the targets’ countries of residency 
on trolling, yet trolling in other countries may differ. In 
addition, online and social media platforms, other than 
Twitter, could be hubs for social media trolling. 
Studying these communities may explain other nuances 
of the socio-cultural impact of social media trolling. 
Still, our comparison, even if limited in scope of 
countries, is valuable as it provides the first step toward 
future cross-cultural research of the effect of online 
disinhibition that may include more countries.  
8. Conclusions 
The major contribution of the paper is our 
demonstration that the online toxic disinhibition effect 
is not blind to demographics of trolling targets. We 
demonstrate that the level of trolling towards users’ 
tweets vary based on the target’s country of residence 
and gender. Thus, we contribute to Suler’s (2004) online 
disinhibition framework by showing that the 
disinhibition effect does not eliminate existing socio-
cultural biases, but rather exacerbate, mediate, or 
alleviate them; targets’ demographics matter. 
Specifically, “minimization of authority” online [2], 
does not completely equalize users on Twitter. 
This is important because prior research largely 
ignored cross-cultural variations in online disinhibition. 
Our study highlights the need for future research on 1) 
trolling in different countries; 2) the extent that toxic 
disinhibition effect mediates, enhances, or reduces 
existing sociocultural biases online; 3) the degree to 
which cultural norms at different levels (nations, 
professions, communities, and small groups) may 
mediate each other in facilitating online trolling; 4) 
trolling on other social media and online platforms.    
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